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Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of Revenue versus
Yield Insurance in the Presence of
Government Payments
D m i t r yV .V e d e n o va n dG a b r i e lJ .P o w e r
Government farm support programs such as Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) and
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) have payoff structures that effectively make them
costless price insurance instruments. A combination of these payments with yield insurance
may provide a viable alternative to revenue insurance. This paper finds that, contrary to
expectations, the revenue product analyzed is uniformly superior to yield insurance under
both current (2002) and proposed (2008) Farm Bill structures of government payments.
Given minor adjustments, however, yield insurance combined with government payments
can provide more effective risk management than revenue insurance in production areas
with low yield–price correlation.
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Government support of crop producers in the
United States is a time-honored tradition
dating back to the 1930s (Kramer 1983). Over
the years, the support programs have been
updated through a series of legislative acts
commonly known as farm bills. Most recently,
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act
of 2002 modified some of the provisions of the
farm payment program and introduced coun-
ter-cyclical farm income support. For the
duration of the 2002 Farm Bill (2002–2007),
eligible crop producers were receiving (fixed)
direct payments (DPs) as well as loan defi-
ciency payments (LDPs) and counter-cyclical
payments (CCPs), which provided protection
against low commodity prices.
As the 2002 Farm Bill neared its expira-
tion, proposals for the new Farm Bill have
been discussed in the Congress for most of
2007. By December 31, 2007, both chambers
of the Congress passed their own versions of
the Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act of
2007, which were still being discussed in a
conference committee as of May 1, 2008.
Several programs from the previous farm bills,
in particular yield and revenue insurance as
well as LDPs, will be continued in the new bill
under the Producer Income Protection Title.
From the risk management perspective, the
most significant changes introduced in the
legislation are the revenue-based Counter-
Cyclical Payments (RCCPs) in the House
version and Average Crop Revenue (ACR)
program in the Senate version. Additional
minor changes include a lower ceiling on
received DPs and the end of the $75,000 limit
on LDPs.
The RCCP proposal gives the producers a
one-time option to select into a revenue-based
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# 2008 Southern Agricultural Economics AssociationCCP program for the entire duration of the
new Farm Bill (2008–2012) instead of the
price-based CCP made available in the 2002
Farm Bill (Shurley and Smith). The current
CCP program remains the default choice for
producers who fail to signal their intentions.
The primary difference between the CCP and
RCCP programs is that whereas CCPs are
determined by the target and seasonal (actual)
market prices, RCCPs are triggered when a
defined measure of the national average
revenue for a given crop drops below a
predetermined target revenue for that crop.
The Senate version of the bill gives
producers the option to select the ACR
program as a replacement for both DPs and
CCPs. ACR consists of two parts: a fixed
component (essentially a revised DP) and a
revenue component (a replacement of CCP).
The fixed component is a fixed per acre
payment rate applied to 85% of base acres.
1
The revenue component of ACR is a payment
made when the state-level average revenue,
based on the harvest price, is less than the
ACR program guarantee revenue. ACR is
therefore similar to RCCP in that it replaces
the current price-based CCP program with a
revenue-based payment program.
In addition to the government payment
programs, crop producers have access to
government-subsidized insurance products ad-
ministered by the Risk Management Agency
(RMA). The most popular among those are
Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) and
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) programs.
MPCI—also referred to as actual production
history (APH) or yield insurance—provides
protection against production risk, while CRC
protects producers against cumulative revenue
shortfall due to any unfavorable combination
of yields and prices.
2
The choice of agricultural insurance cover-
age has been extensively studied in the
literature. Relevant to the present study are
two areas of inquiry. The first is concerned
with the factors that explain the qualitative
choice of a particular program among several
alternatives, for instance revenue insurance as
opposed to yield insurance. The second
addresses the questions of under what condi-
tions and to what extent do government
support payments duplicate the safety net
features of insurance products.
Using a survey of Midwestern corn and
soybean farmers, Sherrick et al. find that
insurance demand (particularly for revenue
insurance) increases with leverage, risk, and
farm size but decreases with wealth. Revenue
insurance users tend to be younger, less
experienced, more highly leveraged, and also
tend to farm a greater number of acres, a
smaller proportion of which they own. Deter-
minants of revenue insurance demand differ
from those of yield insurance. While the use of
revenue insurance is increasing in farm size,
debt-to-asset ratio,and inthe importance given
to risk management strategies, the use of yield
insurance is decreasing in all of these factors.
The difference in the determinants of
participation in revenue insurance versus yield
insurance is also analyzed by Mishra and
Goodwin using 1998 farm-level data from the
Agricultural Resource Management Survey
(ARMS). They find that government pay-
ments positively affect the yield insurance
decision but not the revenue insurance deci-
sion, while conversely the value of production
positively affects the revenue insurance but
not the yield insurance decision. Education
level, farm size, and tenure type also explain
well the adoption of revenue insurance but not
yield insurance.
Revenue insurance programs appear to be
more efficient and less costly to taxpayers than
are traditional agricultural support programs
(Gray, Richardson, and McClasky; Harwood
et al.; Hennessey, Babcock, and Hayes). In
addition, revenue insurance programs appear
tohaveloweradministrativecosts(Skeesetal.).
A related issue is whether the choice of
insurance products is affected by other gov-
1In contrast, direct payment is calculated as a
fixed payment rate per unit of crop weight multiplied
by a preset yield and also applied to 85% of base acres.
2This is certainly not an exhaustive list of
insurance products available to the crop producers.
A detailed description of various insurance programs
can be found, for example, at the Risk Management
Agency’s website at http://www.rma.usda.gov.
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that crop (yield) insurance is widely perceived
by recipients as an income supplement (i.e.,
subsidy). Hauser, Sherrick, and Schnitkey
report that yield insurance but not revenue
insurance is strongly negatively correlated
with CCP.
How exactly indemnities of insurance
payments are related to government payments
is not a trivial question. For instance, revenue
insurance is affected by both price and yield
conditions but counter-cyclical payments are
not, so that the two are not substitutes,
contrary to the perceptions of many produc-
e r s .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h es t r u c t u r eo f
government payments closely resembles pay-
offs of market price risk management instru-
ments such as options. In particular, loan
deficiency payments can be interpreted as free
put options with the strike equal to the
marketing loan rate (Figure 1) and thus can
be considered as substitutes for futures and
options hedging (Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga;
Mahul).
Similarly, the payoff structure of CCP can
be interpreted as a put option bear spread
(Skully and Plato). The bear spread is an
option strategy that guarantees a payoff up to
a certain level whenever the price of the
underlying asset drops below the predeter-
mined level (Figure 2).
Revenue insurance is often seen as a better
choice to manage revenue risk as it protects
producers from revenue shortfalls regardless
of whether they are caused by low prices or
low yields. However, if realizations of prices
and yields are relatively independent, then
managing price and yield risk separately
would have an overall effect similar to that
achieved by using revenue insurance.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate
the hypothesis that such government payment
programs as LDP and CCP—which in effect
act as costless or fully subsidized price
insurance—combined with yield insurance
may be a viable alternative to revenue
insurance, at least in the case of crops and
geographic regions for which yields and prices
are relatively uncorrelated.
More specifically, we analyze the risk-
reducing effectiveness of APH insurance as
opposed to CRC in the presence of govern-
ment payments. Furthermore, we also inves-
tigate potential changes in the relative risk
effectiveness of these contracts under the
proposals of the 2007 Farm Bill, which
essentially replace the price-based CCP pro-
gram with a revenue-based one.
Figure 1. Loan Deficiency Payments as a Function of the Market Price, Corn
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theoretical level is the application of a copula
approach to model the joint distributions of
prices and yields. The copula approach allows
for a more flexible and accurate representation
of dependence between random variables
compared with more restrictive assumptions,
such as multivariate normality.
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section presents a theoretical
framework for the evaluation of revenues
under different combinations of government
payments and insurance contracts as well as
the expected utility approach to compare risky
alternatives. This is followed by a section that
describes the modeling methodology (includ-
ing a copula approach) and the data used in
the analysis. The results are presented and
discussed next. The last section provides
concluding remarks.
Theoretical Framework
We assume a representative farmer receives
revenue from the sale of crops on the spot
market and collects government program
payments, if applicable. To make the analysis
more tractable, we assume the farmer produc-
es only one commodity, corn. Government
payment programs included in the analysis are
DPs, CCPs, and LDPs. In addition, the ACR
and RCCP proposals of the 2007 Farm Bill
are considered. We further assume that the
producer may purchase one of two primary
insurance products—APH or CRC. For sim-
plicity’s sake, we assume that the producer is
eligible for all government payments and that
his/her planted acres are equal to the base
acres for the purpose of calculating DPs and
CCPs.
Direct Payments
DPs are a fixed-payment program that is
calculated as a product of direct payment rate
pDP and base yield yDP and is paid on 85% of
base acres a, such that
ð1Þ DP ~ 0:85a : yDPpDP
Loan Deficiency Payments
The FAIR Act of 1996 included a program of
nonrecourse marketing assistance loans and
LDPs. The nonrecourse loans permit storage
to sell at a later date, presumably when prices
are higher, and being nonrecourse the loans
can be repaid to the Commodity Credit
Figure 2. Counter-Cyclical Payments as a Function of the Market Price, Corn
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itself. Instead of taking the loan, an LDP
option may be chosen. The latter pays
whenever the commodity price p falls below
the loan rate pLDP.
3 The payment applies to
the total amount of production a?y,w h e r e
a is acreage and y is the realized yield, so
that
ð2Þ LDP ~ a : y max pLDP { p,0 ðÞ
Counter-Cyclical Payments
Introduced in 2002 as a new income support
program, CCPs are available for producers of
wheat, feed grains, rice, cotton, and oilseeds.
Payments are made when the market price—
determined as the larger of the marketing loan
rate pLDP and marketing-year average (MYA)
price pMYA—is below the predetermined CCP
target price pCCP adjusted for direct payment
rate, pDP. Unlike LDPs, CCPs do not depend
on actual production levels. Instead, a fixed
CCP yield is applied to 85% of base acres so
that
ð3Þ
CCP ~ 0:85a : yCCP max pCCP { pDP ½
{ max pMYA, pLDP ðÞ ,0 
Actual Production History
APH insurance is the longest running and the
most traditional crop insurance program and
is only meant to insure against the risk of low
yield. APH pays out when actual yield is less
than a stated guaranteed yield. The latter
equals the APH yield
4 times the producer-
chosen coverage level, gAPH, which ranges
from 50% to 85% in 5% increments. The APH
per acre payment equals the yield shortfall
multiplied by the indemnity price, which is
selected by the farmer as 60% to 100% of the
price established by the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corporation (FCIC). Overall,
ð4Þ
APH gCRC ðÞ
~ a : pAPH max gAPHyAPH { y,0 ðÞ :
Crop Revenue Coverage
CRC is the most widely available revenue
insurance contract. It provides insurance
against low yields, low prices, or both. An
indemnity is paid if the actual gross revenue is
less than the revenue guarantee. Furthermore,
a majority of the CRC contracts are pur-
chased with the harvest price option, which
allows for calculation of the revenue guarantee




~ a max gCRC : yAPH max pCRC, pHarv ðÞ { y : p,0

,
where y and p are the realized yield and price,
respectively, yAPH is the APH yield, gCRC is
the selected coverage level (between 50% and
85% in 5% increments), pCRC is the base
(planting time) price, and pHarv is the harvest
time price.
5
Both APH and CRC contracts are subsi-
dized, but still they require premium payments
on the part of the producer. The premiums are
established by the RMA based on location,
production history, contract type, and cover-
age selection.
Revenue Counter-Cyclical Payments (RCCP)
and Average Crop Revenue (ACR) Program
Under the House version of the 2007 Farm
Bill, producers may elect to receive RCCPs
instead of CCPs. RCCPs are triggered when-
ever the national actual revenue falls below the
national target revenue, RUS, that is preset for
the duration of the Farm Bill (Shurley and
Smith). The national actual revenue is deter-
mined as the product of the realized average
national yield, yUS, and the larger of the
3Commodity prices for the purposes of LDP
settlement are determined by the local Farm Service
Agency offices.
4APH yields are generally calculated as a 6- to 10-
year average of actual farm-level yields subject to
additional conditions. The reader may refer to
relevant RMA publications for specific details.
5Base and harvest prices are determined as
monthly average of corresponding futures prices (Risk
Management Agency 2004).
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marketing loan rate, pLDP. The RCCP pay-
ment rate, pRCCP, is calculated as
pRCCP ~ max RUS { yUS max pMYA, pLDP ðÞ ,0 ðÞ =yNP,
where yNP is a national payment yield also
preset for the duration of the bill. The RCCP
rate is then applied to 85% of base acres times
CCP yield so that
ð6Þ
RCCP ~ 0:85a : yCCP pRCCP
~ 0:85a : yCCP
| max RUS ð {yUS max pMYA, pLDP ðÞ ,0 Þ=yNP:
Under the Senate version, electing for ACR
replaces both DPs and CCPs. The ACR
payment is calculated as a sum of a fixed
component and a revenue component. The
former is calculated as a fixed per acre
payment pACRF times 85% of base acres and
is analogous to DPs. The latter is triggered
when the actual state revenue, ASR, falls
below the ACR program guarantee ACRGuar
and is calculated as the difference between the
two adjusted to 90% of the ratio of APH yield
to state projected (trend) yield, so that
ACRR ~ max ACRGuar { ASR,0 ðÞ : 0:9 : yAPH=  y yState:
The ACR program guarantee, in turn, is
set at 90% of a product of the state trend,
y ¯State, and the CRC base price,
6 pCRC,w h i l e
the actual state revenue is determined as the
realized state average yield, yState, multiplied
by the CRC harvest price, pHarv. The per acre
payment is received on the base acres so that
ð7Þ
ACR ~ ACRF z ARCR ~ 0:85a : pACRF
z a max   y yState pCRC { yState pHarv,0 ðÞ
| 0:9yAPH=  y yState,
where y ¯State is the state projected (trend) yield
based on 1980–2006 yields (Shurley and
Smith).
For the purpose of our analysis, the risk-
reducing effectiveness of APH is compared
with that of CRC in three scenarios—2002
Farm Bill, RCCP proposal, and ACR pro-
posal. Given a selection of corresponding
coverage levels, the total wealth of the
representative farmer in each case will be
determined as follows:
ð8aÞ
WAPH,2002 ~ w0 z LDP z DP z CCP
z APH gAPH ðÞ { a : Pg APH ðÞ ,
WCRC,2002 ~ w0 z LDP z DP z CCP
z CRC gCRC ðÞ { a : Pg CRC ðÞ ,
ð8bÞ
WAPH,RCCP ~ w0 z LDP z DP z RCCP
z APH gAPH ðÞ { a : Pg APH ðÞ ,
WCRC,RCCP ~ w0 z LDP z DP z RCCP
z CRC gCRC ðÞ { a : Pg CRC ðÞ ,
ð8cÞ
WAPH,ACR ~ w0 z LDP z ACR
z APH gAPH ðÞ { a : Pg APH ðÞ ,
WCRC,ACR ~ w0 z LDP z ACR
z CRC gCRC ðÞ { a : Pg CRC ðÞ ,
where w0 is an initial level of wealth, and P(?)
are per acre premiums determined by the
contract type and selected coverage level.
Expected Utility and Certainty-
Equivalent Wealth
We assume that in order to compare risky
alternatives presented in Equations (8a–c), a
producer uses the expected utility frame-
work. More specifically, in each of the
scenarios, the producer first selects the cover-
age levels gAPH and gCRC that maximize
expected utility for the respective insurance
products, and then selects the insurance
contract with the highest achievable level of
expected utility. More formally, the producer
first solves for
g 
APH ~ arg max EUW APH,
. ðÞ ,
g 
CRC ~ arg max EUW CRC,
. ðÞ ,
and then selects either APH or CRC based





CRC). For illustrative purposes,
the expected utility can be converted to a
certainty–equivalent wealth, CEW,s u c ht h a t
6More specifically, a 3-year average of these
prices.
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therefore be compared in terms of a certain
wealth the producer would be willing to accept
in lieu of the random amount. The specific
form and parameterization of the utility
function is discussed in the next section.
Simulation Methodology and Data Analysis
Several variables needed to compute payoffs
in Equations (2–7) are nondeterministic.
These include farm-level yield, y, harvest cash
price, p, marketing year average price, pMYA,
CRC harvest price, pHarv, realized average
national yield, yUS, and realized state average
yield, yState. If a number of realizations of
these variables are generated, a Monte Carlo
approach can then be used to calculate the
expected utilities of final wealth in Equations
(8a–c).
The variables of interest have to be
simulated based on historical data, with an
emphasis placed on preserving the joint
dependence structure between yields and
prices. However, estimation of a full joint
distribution of six variables is a challenging
task complicated by the shortness of available
data series and by distortions introduced by
the agricultural policies.
A common approach in the literature is to
impose observed price–yield correlations on
generated price and yield series, therefore
essentially to model the price–yield relation-
ship as a multivariate normal distribution
(e.g., Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga). Farm-level
yields are typically modeled as a parametric
distribution around parametric or nonpara-
metric distributions of county-level yields
(e.g., Ker and Goodwin; Schnitkey, Sherrick,
and Irwin; Vedenov et al.). However, these
approaches may impose rather strict and not
always realistic assumptions. An alternative
methodology for modeling joint distributions
that provides more flexibility and that relies
on less restrictive assumptions is a copula
approach. Copulas are widely used in the
financial literature (e.g., Cherubini, Luciano,
and Vecchiato) but generally have not found
their way yet into the agricultural economics
literature.
Overview of Copulas
The following presentation is based on Nelsen,
which provides a more thorough treatment of
the subject. Generally speaking, a copula may
be described as a function relating a joint
distribution and its marginals. In a two-
dimensional case, a copula is defined as a
function C(u, v) : [0, 1] 3 [0, 1] R [0, 1] such
that C(u,0 )5 C(0, v) 5 0, C(u,1 )5 u and
C(1, v) 5 v, for all u, v M [0, 1], and C(u2, v2) 2
C(u2, v1) 2 C(u1, v2) + C(u1, v1) . 0. Any
copula function by itself represents a joint
distribution of two random variables with
uniform marginal distributions on [0, 1].
Sklar’s Theorem states that any continuous
joint cumulative density function F(x, y) 5
Pr{X # x, Y # y} is related to its marginal
density functions Fx(x)5 Pr{X # x}a n dFy(y)
5 Pr{Y # y} through a unique copula func-
tion CF(?, ?) such that F(x, y) 5 CF(Fx(x),
Fy(y)). Conversely, any copula function C(?, ?)
applied to the cumulative density functions of
any two random variables Fx(x) 5 Pr{X # x}
and Fy(y) 5 Pr{Y # y} generates a cumulative
density function FC(x, y) 5 C(Fx(x), Fy(y)) of
x and y with the marginals Fx(x)a n dFy(y).
The latter property allows estimation of joint
distributions given marginal CDFs of vari-
ables of interest and a choice of a copula. The
selected copula function describes the depen-
dence structure between the random variables
without the need to explicitly specify the
functional form of the joint CDF (Chen and
Huang).
A copula approach can be applied to
Monte Carlo analysis in a relatively straight-
forward fashion. Given an n-dimensional
copula function Cn(u1, u2,… ,un) and a vector
of n marginal CDFs {F1, F2,… ,Fn}o fr a n -
dom variables {x1, x2,… ,xn}, the following
method can be used to generate random draws
from the joint distribution FC(x1, x2,… ,xn)o f
these variables implied by the copula (Cher-
ubini, Luciano, and Vecciato). First, the
required number N of random draws of
vectors {u1, u2,… ,un}
N
i51 are generated from
the copula itself. Second, each generated
vector is transformed using the inverse CDFs
{F1, F2,… ,Fn}. The resulting random vectors
Vedenov and Power: Revenue versus Yield Insurance in the Presence of Government Payments 449x1, x2,..., xn fg
N
i~1~ F{1
1 u1 ðÞ , F{1







are the desired random draws from FC(x1, x2,
…, xn).
The choice of a copula itself is a nontrivial
matter, since there are an infinite number of
functions satisfying copula conditions. Several
functional forms for copulas have been used in
the financial literature. The Gaussian copula,
which corresponds to the joint multivariate
normal distribution, is especially popular and
can be used when the dependence structure
between the random variables is elliptical
(Nelsen). An alternative approach is to use a
nonparametric empirical kernel copula, which
is related to multivariate kernel density distri-
butions (Wand and Jones). The advantage of
the kernel copula is that it imposes no
assumptions on the dependence structure be-
tween the random variables, but rather deter-
mines it from the data. We use both Gaussian
and empirical kernel density copulas to generate
the random draws required for the analysis.
7
Simulation Approach
Historical data are available for national,
state, and county yields, as well as for cash,
MYA, and futures prices for major commod-
ities. Yield series in some cases go as far back
as 70–80 years. Price series are generally
available for up to 40 years. However, farm-
level yield series are usually much shorter and
rarely extend past 10–15 years. Given the data
limitations, estimating a marginal distribution
of yields for a single farm would be unrealistic.
Instead, a representative farm in a given
county was modeled. Since county data series
are usually longer and more reliable, we used
all available farm-level yield series for a given
county to calculate farm-level shocks relative
to the realized county yield. The marginal
distributions of national, state, and county
yields and farm-level shocks were then esti-
mated from the historical data using the
nonparametric kernel density approach (Ker
and Goodwin; Wand and Jones).
Following Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga, we
assumed that the local cash prices, p, and the
marketing year average prices, pMYA, are
driven by the harvest-time futures prices f1,
which are also used by the RMA to determine
the CRC harvest price, pHarv. Therefore, we
modeled p and pMYA as
ð9Þ
p ~ b0 z b1f1 z e,




1 f1 z eMYA,




where the residual terms are independent
shocks with zero mean and appropriate vari-
ance.
Furthermore, we modeled the harvest-time
futures price f1 as a log-normally distributed
shock applied to the (known) planting time
futures price f0 so that
ð10Þ
f1 ~ f0 exp d ln f ðÞ ,




Finally, since the futures markets are
national in scope, we assumed that the
dependence structure present in the historical
data on national yields and harvest time
futures prices adequately represents the rela-
tionship between yields and prices.
The necessary realizations of yields and
prices were then generated in several steps.
First, a Gaussian copula was used to generate
draws from the joint distribution of d ln f and
national yields yUS. That is, the inverse log-
normal CDF and inverse kernel-density CDF,
respectively, were applied to the pairs of
random draws generated from the Gaussian
copula.
8 The generated realizations of d ln f
7The issue of the optimal copula selection is
outside of the scope of this paper. The reader may
refer to Nelsen for further references.
8Technical details of generating random draws
from parametric and nonparametric copulas are
omitted here due to space considerations and available
from the authors upon request. The reader may also
refer to Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecciato for more
information.
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futures prices f1 from Equation (10) and
therefore the CRC harvest prices pHarv 5 f1.
The cash price, p, and MYA price, pMYA,w e r e
generated according to Equation (9) with
additional random shocks drawn from the
normal distributions implied by the regres-
sions in Equation (9).
At the second step, a similar procedure was
applied to generate realizations of state and
county yields conditional on the national
yields generated at the first step. In particular,
the inverse kernel density marginal CDFs of
the corresponding yield distributions were
applied to the random draws from a three-
dimensional kernel copula derived from the
historical data on national, state, and county
yields and conditional on the previously
generated national yields.
Finally, realizations of farm-level yields, y,
were generated using a two-dimensional
kernel copula derived from the historical data
on farm-level and county-level yields and
conditional on the realizations of county
yields generated at the second step.
Once the realizations of all the relevant
variables were generated, the payoffs of
government payment programs and insurance
contracts in Equations (2–7) could be evalu-
ated and the expected utility of the final
wealth for each scenario in Equations (8a–c)
calculated.
Data and Parameterization
For the purpose of the present paper, corn
production was compared in Iowa and Texas.
Iowa is the largest corn-growing state in the
country and tends to have yields that are
highly correlated with national prices. Corn
production in Texas is on a much smaller scale
and, as a consequence, yields are less closely
related to prices. It was therefore hypothesized
that the risk-reducing effectiveness of APH
insurance combined with government pay-
ments (DP, LDP, CCP) may be comparable




TX Iowa Texas U.S.
2006 Planted acreage, thousand
acres 306 62.7 14,300 1,760 78,327
Yields
Base year trend, y ¯, bu/ac 163.9 100.0 158.9 126.6 137.3
DP and CCP yield, yDP 5 yCCP,
bu/ac 146.1 80.9 — — —
APH yield, yAPH, bu/ac 156.3 75.4 — — —
Correlation between detrended
yields and log-difference in
futures prices 20.25 20.08 20.32 20.06 20.53
Parameters of Cash Price Regression
b0 —— 20.004 (0.963) 0.476 (0.002) —
b1 — — 0.911 (0.000) 0.858 (0.000) —
s — — 0.131 0.222 —
Adjusted R
2 — — 0.948 0.829 —
Parameters of MYA Price Regression
b0
MYA — — 0.347 (0.020) 0.638 (0.000) —
b1
MYA — — 0.775 (0.000) 0.784 (0.000) —
s
MYA — — 0.216 0.230 —
Adjusted R
2 — — 0.849 0.814 —
Notes: Base year refers to 2006. DP and CCP yields are 1998–2001 averages of actual yields. APH yields for base year are 10-year
averages (1996–2005) of actual yields. Regression parameters are explained in Equation (9). Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
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but not necessarily in Iowa.
Representative farms were assumed to be
located in Kossuth County, Iowa, and Jack-
son County, Texas. Both counties are among
the largest corn-producing counties in their
respective states. Each representative farm was
assumed to consist of 100 acres, all of which
were treated as base acres for the purposes of
government payments. Initial wealth w0 was
set to $50,000.
Farm-level yield data for Kossuth County,
Iowa, (743 observations) and Jackson County,
Texas (49 observations), from 1980 to 1994
were obtained from an RMA data set.
County-, state-, and national-level yields from
1968 trough 2006 were collected from the
National Agricultural Statistical Service
(NASS). Farm-level data were converted to
multiplicative shocks relative to the corre-
sponding county yields. For county, state, and
national yields, a simple log-linear trend was
fitted to each series and all observations were
converted to multiplicative shocks relative to
the trend. The year 2006 was selected as a base
(trend) year, since it was the latest year for
which all data were available.
Futures prices for December corn contracts
from 1969 through 2007 were obtained from
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Follow-
ing the RMA procedures (RMA 2003),
February average futures prices were used as
the CRC base price, pCRC, as well as a proxy
for the planting-time futures prices f0, while
October average futures prices were used as
the CRC harvest price, pHarv,a sw e l la sa
proxy for the harvest-time futures prices f1.
Normality of the log-difference of futures
prices d ln f could not be rejected at the 92%
confidence level, therefore the sample mean
and standard deviation of the data series for
d ln f were used as parameters of the normal
distribution in (10).
Cash prices were approximated by the
average October prices received by producers
in corresponding states.
9 These and market
year average prices from 1968 to 2007 were
also obtained from NASS. Both data series
were regressed on d ln f in order to determine
the parameters in Equation (9). The informa-
tion on and selected statistics of historical data
seriesare summarized inTable 1.Notethatthe
detrended county yields and log-difference in
futures prices exhibit much stronger negative
correlation for Kossuth County, Iowa, than
they do for Jackson County, Texas. Further-
more, the cash price basis in Texas is much
higher thanin Iowa, wherenational prices tend
to be tracked quite closely.
9October was chosen to match the procedure
applied to the futures prices.
Table 2. Parameters of Government Pay-




DP rate, pDP, $/bu $0.28
Target price for CCPs, pCCP,
$/bu $2.63
Marketing loan rate, pLDP, $/bu $1.82 $2.06
APH established price, pAPH,
$/bu $2.00 $2.00




National target revenue, RUS,
$/ac $344.12
National payment yield, yNP,
bu/ac 114.4
Average crop revenue program
Fixed component rate, pACRF,
$/ac $15
State average (trend) yield,
y ¯State, bu/ac 158.9 126.6
Sources: RMA website, http://www.rma.usda.gov; FSA
website, http://www.fsa.usda.gov; Shurley and Smith 2007.
Table 3. Parameters of Utility Function
Risk Premium, h
Risk Aversion, c
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and insurance programs for the base year
(2006) were obtained from the RMA and
Farm Service Agency (FSA) websites (FSA;
RMA 2007). For simplicity’s sake, both DP
and CCP yields were set to the corresponding
1998–2001 yield averages. Details on the
proposed RCCP and ACR programs were
obtained from Shurley and Smith and applied
to the base year. APH price election was set to
100%. Actual premiums for APH and CRC
insurance contracts for various coverage levels
were obtained using the RMA premium
calculator and county-specific information
for 2006. The parameters of government
programs are summarized in Table 2.
For the analysis, 20,000 random draws of
all relevant variables were generated following
the procedure described above. The generated
results were then used to calculate the
expected utility of final wealth for different
scenarios and coverage levels. A CRRA power
utility function
Ux ; c ðÞ ~
x1{c
1 { c
was used for the expected utility analysis.
Following Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman, the
risk aversion parameter c was selected so as to
represent the risk premium a producer would be
willing to forgo in order to replace a risky
payoff with its expected value. More specifical-
ly, for a given risk premium hand a risky payoff
x, the corresponding parameter c of the utility
function was determined from the condition
ð11Þ U 1 { h ðÞ Ex;c ðÞ ~ EUx ; c ðÞ :
Risk premiums were set to 0% (risk-
neutrality), 5%,a n d1 0 %, and the net wealth
without any form of government support was
used as the reference risky payoff in Equa-
tion (11). The corresponding levels of risk
aversion c are summarized in Table 3. Note
that the same risk premium corresponds to a
higher level of risk aversion for Iowa than for
Texas, which reflects higher risk associated
with crop production in Texas.
10
Results
Presented in Table 4 are the maximum achiev-
able levels of certainty-equivalent wealth for
APH and CRC contracts in the presence of
government payments under the provisions of
the 2002 Farm Bill. The certainty-equivalent
wealth for different coverage levels of insur-
ance contracts are also shown in Figures 3 and
4 for a risk premium of 10%.
The producer’s expected utility is generally
increasing in the coverage level and the
maximum risk reduction is almost always
achieved at the highest available coverage
levels. That the risk-neutral producer (risk
premium of 0%) would select a coverage level
10Intuitively, a producer must be less risk averse to
forego the same portion of certain revenue when
presented with higher risk than when presented with
lower risk.
Table 4. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Provisions of 2002 Farm Bill
Risk Premium
Maximum Achievable CE Wealth, $ Thousands Coverage Level Required
APH CRC APH CRC
Kossuth County, IA
0% $95.20 $96.23 80% 85%
5% $93.25 $94.99 85% 85%
10% $91.95 $94.17 85% 85%
Jackson County, TX
0% $80.50 $80.47 55% 50%
5% $77.43 $77.47 75% 70%
10% $74.76 $74.95 75% 75%
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fact that the insurance premiums are not
actuarially fair, although in Texas this effect
is not nearly as pronounced as it is in Iowa.
For a risk-averse producer, CRC turns out
to be a more efficient risk management
instrument in both the Iowa and Texas
counties analyzed. While the result for Iowa
is as expected, the dominance of CRC in
Texas is contrary to our hypothesis. However,
the performance of APH is much closer to
that of CRC for Texas than for Iowa.
A possible explanation of this result may be
the discrepancy between the APH and CRC
contractprices.Theformerisestablishedbythe
FCIC and does not change during the growing
Figure 4. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Provisions of 2002 Farm
Bill, Jackson County, TX (Risk Premium of 10%)
Figure 3. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Provisions of 2002 Farm
Bill, Kossuth County, IA (Risk Premium of 10%)
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planting-time futures prices and may further
increase during the growing season. In the base
year (2006), the established APH price was
$2.00/bu, while the CRC base price was $2.59/
bu in Iowa and $2.38 in Texas (Table 2). To
verifythisconjecture,weransimulationsover a
(counterfactual) range of higher APH prices,
pAPH, between $2.05/bu and $2.50/bu. The
results of this analysis are presented in Table 5
as well as in Figures 5 and 6 for the case of a
10% risk premium.
For Iowa, APH does not catch up to CRC
even for the established APH price set at
$2.50/bu. For Texas, on the other hand, there
is a range of reasonable contract prices at
which APH matches or even dominates CRC.
Specifically, APH becomes competitive with
CRC at the APH price of pAPH 5 $2.20/bu
and dominates it at any coverage level at pAPH
Table 5. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Provisions of 2002 Farm Bill,
Counterfactual APH Prices
Risk Premium APH Price
Maximum Achievable CE Wealth, $
Thousands Coverage Level Required
APH CRC APH CRC
Kossuth County, IA
0% $2.50 $95.47 $96.23 85% 85%
5% $2.50 $93.74 $94.99 85% 85%
10% $2.50 $92.59 $94.17 85% 85%
Jackson County, TX
0% $2.00 $80.50 $80.47 60% 50%
5% $2.10 $77.50 $77.47 75% 70%
10% $2.20 $74.98 $74.95 75% 75%
Figure 5. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Provisions of 2002 Farm
Bill, Counterfactual APH Prices, Kossuth County, IA (Risk Premium of 10%)
Vedenov and Power: Revenue versus Yield Insurance in the Presence of Government Payments 455Figure 7. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Proposals of 2007 Farm Bill
Figure 6. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Provisions of 2002 Farm
Bill, Counterfactual APH Prices, Jackson County, TX (Risk Premium of 10%)
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APH becomes competitive with CRC at APH
prices that are even closer to the actual level.
Thus, in the presence of government pay-
ments, APH could be fairly competitive for
Texas corn production with only minor
increases in the APH base price, while CRC
would dominate APH in Iowa even at
significantly higher APH prices.
Lastly, we performed the same analysis
under the 2007 Farm Bill proposals, namely
with RCCP replacing price-based CCP, and
the ACR program replacing both DPs and
CCPs. The results are presented in Table 6
and in Figure 7.
The results in Figure 7 show that the
RCCP proposal improves the risk-reducing
effectiveness of both APH and CRC regard-
less of location. On the other hand, ACR
improves the effectiveness of both contracts in
Texas but actually reduces their effectiveness
in Iowa, particularly for high coverage levels.
This suggests that the ACR program may
replicate insurance contracts in high yield-
price correlation areas. Table 6 indicates that
the 2007 Farm Bill proposals generally do not
affect the comparative performance of APH
compared with CRC. For Iowa, neither ACR
nor RCCP allows APH to be competitive with
CRC, although APH is somewhat closer to
CRC under ACR. For Texas, APH can
become competitive with CRC under a small
adjustment of the established APH price.
Moreover, the required adjustment under the
ACR program is smaller than it is under both
RCCP and the 2002 Farm Bill provisions.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the conditions under
which yield (APH) insurance may provide a
competitive alternative to revenue (CRC)
insurance in the presence of such government
payments as LDP and CCP, both of which
provide, in effect, costless price insurance.
Results for corn in a high-production region
Table 6. Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under Proposals of 2007 Farm Bill,
Counterfactual APH Prices
Risk Premium APH Price
Maximum Achievable CE Wealth,
$ Thousands Coverage Level Required
APH CRC APH CRC
Kossuth County, IA
ACR Proposal
0% $2.50 $94.78 $95.55 85% 85%
5% $2.50 $93.20 $94.27 85% 85%
10% $2.50 $92.11 $93.40 85% 85%
RCCP Proposal
0% $2.50 $97.14 $97.91 85% 85%
5% $2.50 $95.18 $96.49 85% 85%
10% $2.50 $93.85 $95.55 85% 85%
Jackson County, TX
ACR Proposal
0% $2.00 $82.11 $82.08 60% 50%
5% $2.05 $79.42 $79.41 75% 70%
10% $2.15 $77.10 $77.08 75% 75%
RCCP Proposal
0% $2.00 81.48 81.45 60% 50%
5% $2.10 78.12 78.10 75% 70%
10% $2.20 75.32 75.32 75% 75%
Vedenov and Power: Revenue versus Yield Insurance in the Presence of Government Payments 457(Kossuth County, Iowa) and in a low-produc-
tion region (Jackson County, Texas) are
compared. The analysis indicates that APH
has the potential to compete with CRC in
geographical areas characterized by low yield–
price correlation, although this is conditional
on the relationship between the APH estab-
lished price and the CRC base price. The
competitiveness of APH in Texas holds both
under the provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill and
under the proposals of the 2007 Farm Bill that
were known at the time this paper was written.
The analysis of the programs included in
the House and Senate versions of the bill
indicates that the introduction of RCCP will
improve the risk-reducing effectiveness of both
APH and CRC contracts. However, the effect
of ACR varies substantially between the high
and low price–yield correlation areas. Fur-
thermore, APH becomes competitive with
CRC in the presence of ACR under smaller
adjustments of the established APH prices,
suggesting that ACR may replicate to some
extent the safety net provided by other
programs and available insurance contracts.
The paper also makes a contribution at the
methodological level through the application
of a copula approach to model the joint
distributions of prices and yields. This ap-
proach provides greater accuracy and flexibil-
ity in capturing the dependence structure
between several random variables than does
the imposition of more restrictive parametric
assumptions such as multivariate normality.
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